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Introduction.
An increasingly common approach to the theoretical analysis of monetary policy is to ensure that a proposed policy does not introduce real indeterminacy and thus sunspot fluctuations into the model economy. Policy is typically conducted in terms of directives for the nominal interest rate. For example, a simple Taylor (1993) The basic conclusion of the Carlstrom-Fuerst analysis is something of a ½ rule-to ensure real determinacy, we need γ < ½. That is, for a given 100 basis point movement in 1 In a model with uncertainty this corresponds to targeting the expected inflation rate, a policy consistent with the practice of many central banks. Taylor's (1993) original rule has the central bank responding to past inflation rates. Since lagged inflation rates are good predictors of the future inflation rate, Taylor's empirical formulation of the rule can be viewed as a reduced form representation of a structural policy of targeting expected inflation. For the indeterminacy issues of this paper the structural version of the rule is more appropriate. The original Taylor Rule also had the central bank responding to output. This addition has no quantitative importance for the issues of this paper.
the real rate the central bank must limit the movement of the nominal rate to under 50 basis points. 3 The intuition for determinacy vs. indeterminacy goes something like this:
Suppose that the real rate rises by 1%, and that the central bank allows the nominal rate to rise by γ%. This increase in the nominal rate depresses current real activity (i.e. consumption) thus leading to a higher real rate. This completed circle is suggestive of sunspots. Whether sunspots arise depends upon the elasticity, γ-with a small response, there is real determinacy, with a large response there are sunspots.
The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate the sensitivity of these stability conclusions to apparently small changes in the modeling structure. We utilize a moneyin-the-utility function (MIUF) environment because of its generality. Feenstra (1986) demonstrates that any transactions cost (TC) economy can be written as a MIUF economy. Similarly, a shopping-time (ST) model can be rewritten as a MIUF economy.
Finally, cash-in-advance (CIA) models are extreme versions of MIUF and TC economies.
Thus, a MIUF environment is quite general. The TC, ST, and CIA assumptions simply imply particular functional forms for the MIUF economy.
We analyze a MIUF economy under differing assumptions about the money balances that enter into the utility function. In Model 1, we assume timing that is a direct extension of typical CIA timing. That is, the money available to satisfy consumption needs is the money the household has left after leaving the bond market and before entering the goods market. In contrast, in Model 2 we assume that goods market trading occurs first, and that bond trading occurs at the end of the period. Finally, in Model 3 we assume that end-of-period money balances enter the utility functional, net of current income and current consumption. Benhabib, Grohe, and Uribe (1998) . Section 6 concludes.
A MIUF Economy.
The economy consists of numerous infinitely-lived households with preferences given by
where c t and A t /P t denote consumption and real money balances, respectively. The key issue is what measure of money appears in the utility function. We will turn to this shortly. The intertemporal budget constraint is given by 5 M t+1 = M t + X t + B t-1 R t-1 -B t -P t c t + P t y t , where M t denotes money balances at the beginning of time t, X t denotes a monetary transfer from the government, B t-1 are bond-holdings acquired in period t-1, R t-1 denotes the nominal interest rate from t-1 to t, and the endowment is normalized to y t = 1. Below we extend the analysis to an economy with endogenous production. Model 1:
Model 2:
A t = M t + X t
Model 3:
A t = M t+1 = M t + X t + B t-1 R t-1 -B t -P t c t + P t y Models 1 and 2 assume that what matters for time-t transactions is the money with which one enters the time-t goods market. The two models differ in the order in which bonds and goods trading occurs.
In Model 1, net bond trading is included in time-t money holdings since the bond market is assumed to open before (or concurrently with) the goods market, and therefore bonds can be transformed into money in advance of goods market trading. This assumption is typically used in CIA models (eg., Lucas (1982) and Lucas and Stokey (1987) In any event, the Euler equations that define equilibrium in the three models are given by:
Model 2:
Model 3:
Note the differences between the Fisher equations in Models 1 and 2 (equations (1) and (3)). In Model 2, the household can substitute current goods for current bonds with no change in the money balances that enter the current utility function. Instead, purchasing a bond sacrifices future transactions facilitation. In contrast, under Model 1, an increase in bond purchases come at the expense of current money balances and the resulting ability to carry out current transactions. Thus, the time-t marginal utility of money enters into (1) but not (3). These differences in timing also manifest themselves in the timing differences in the money demand equations (2) and (4).
As for Model 3, the Fisher equation (5) These differences in timing across the models have no effect on equilibrium determinacy under some natural choices for monetary policy. For example, if the central bank engineers a constant money growth rate (or a money growth rule that depends on state variables) the conditions for determinacy in the three models are nearly equivalent.
This arises because the Euler equation for money holdings are quite similar across the models. In Models 1 and 2 this Euler equation is given by
while in Model 3 we have
The timing difference between the first two models and Model 3 arises because in the latter model current consumption is subtracted from current money holdings.
However, these modeling differences have an important effect when one assumes that the central bank conducts policy according to a nominal interest rate rule. For example, suppose that the central bank conducts policy according to the following rule:
That is, the central bank varies the nominal rate in relation to movements in the real rate with an elasticity of γ. The different Fisher equations across the models leads to the following money reaction functions (real money supply curves):
Model 2 and Model 3:
The bounds on γ for real determinacy are quite different across the models.
The economic intuition for real indeterminacy revolves around the slope of these real money supply curves. In the case of Model 1, equation (8) implies that (for a given m t+1 ) an increase in m t decreases the real rate if and only if (U mm + U cm ) < 0. This is typically the case. For example, henceforth assume that preferences are given by
The homotheticity assumption implies a unit consumption elasticity. The properties of h(.) determine the interest elasticity of money demand with concavity needed to ensure that money demand is decreasing in the nominal rate. These preferences are consistent with any sign for U cm , but in either case we have (U mm + U cm ) < 0. Thus, regardless of the sign of U cm , the money supply curve (8) In sharp contrast to Model 1, in Models 2 and 3 the slope of the supply curve depends on the sign of U cm . If U cm > 0, then equation (9) implies that (for a given m t+1 ) a decrease in m t decreases the real rate, so that the supply curve slope has the same sign as γ. Suppose that real balances fall. This implies that the real rate falls. If the nominal rate rises by an appropriate amount (a downwardly sloped supply curve), then the initial decline in real balances is rational. Hence, under Models 2 and 3 monetary policies with negative γ's will tend to generate sunspots-exactly the converse of Model 1. If instead U cm < 0, then monetary policies with positive γ's will tend to generate sunspotsconsistent with Model 1. In the next sections we develop the quantitative details of this basic intuition.
Real Indeterminacy in an Endowment Economy.

A. Model 1
Using the monetary policy rule (8), money supply equals money demand for model 
is the (gross) interest elasticity of money supply (holding period t+1 money constant). 6 For real determinacy, we need ∆ to be outside the unit circle. That is,
Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for indeterminacy is that 0 2 < ε < η .
A necessary condition for indeterminacy is that money supply, like money demand, slope down. The intuition for this can be broken into two parts. Suppose that 2η< ε < η (∆>0) so that money supply cuts demand from above. In this case an exogenous increase in future real balances rise shifts out the supply curve of money today leading to higher real balances today. Since ∆>0 higher real balances today lead to higher real balances tomorrow thus completing the circle. The other possibility is for η<ε <0 (∆<0) so that supply cuts demand from below. In this case, things work the opposite of above: An increase in future real balances shifts today's supply curve out leading to lower current real balances. Now ∆<0 so that lower real balances today lead to higher real balances tomorrow.
Solving for a condition in γ yields: Notice that for separable preferences the condition for determinacy is γ < ½. This is the same condition as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) . We will return to this similarity below.
B.
Model 2.
Proceeding as before, under the posited policy rule Model 2's money supply equal money demand implies:
6 The condition
is also used to calculate ∆. If ε < 0 then the downward sloping supply curve always cuts demand from above. Now increases in m t+1 shifts time-t supply to the right and time-t demand down. This increases m t and since ∆>0 completes the circle. If ε>-2η, however, then the upward sloping supply curve always cuts demand from below. Now increases in m t+1 shifts timet supply to the right and time-t demand down. As long as supply compared to demand is sufficiently elastic this decreases m t and since ∆ < 0 completes the circle.
We can now state: 
C.
Model 3.
In the case of Model 3, the equilibrium condition is given by 
The function q( ) is needed because of the unusual form of the money demand equation (6) Since η < 0, a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy is ε > 0, or ε < 2η. As before, a necessary condition for indeterminacy is that the supply curve slope down (the intuition is symmetric with Model 1). As with Model 2, the supply curve slope depends upon γ and the sign of U cm . Thus we have two separate cases: 
Real Indeterminacy in a Production Economy.
The previous sections developed the numerical details of the intuition discussed in section 2. In short, a necessary condition for indeterminacy is that the real money supply curve slope down, ε < 0.
7 Under the posited interest rate rule (7), the central bank moves the nominal rate in response to the real rate with elasticity γ. Thus the sign of ε depends upon the sign of γ and the effect of real balances on the real rate. One major reason why the conditions for determinacy differ across the models is because of differences in the effect that real balances have on the real rate. In Model 1, higher real balances unambiguously lower the real rate, so that ε has the opposite sign of γ. In Models 2 and 3, the effect of real balances on the real rate depends upon the sign of U cm . If U cm > 0, ε has the same sign as γ; if U cm < 0, ε has the opposite sign of γ. The other major difference 
Production takes the standard Cobb-Douglas form:
The additional Euler equations for labor choice (10) and capital accumulation (11) are familiar:
These Euler equations are common across all three models because consumption and output enter symmetrically in all three models. Real money balances indirectly enter both of these marginal conditions via the cross partials of the utility function. As a result the behavior of the nominal interest rate (and hence real balances) typically distorts the economy's behavior relative to an otherwise standard real business cycle (RBC) model.
As an example of this distortion, recall that Model 1 timing (equation (2)) implies
Note that [U c (t)+U m (t)] is the marginal utility of an extra unit of real cash balances at the beginning of time-t. Substituting (13) into (10)- (11), the nominal interest rate in the denominator of (13) can be interpreted as a tax on real balances, so that we have an RBC economy with a distortionary tax. If in addition we assume a rigid CIA constraint so that U m drops out of the system, this tax can be more directly interpreted as a consumption tax. As noted by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) , a policy in which the central bank moves the nominal rate (consumption tax) too sharply with the real rate of interest (a large γ) is likely to produce real indeterminacy.
In sharp contrast to the previous example, if utility is separable between consumption and real balances then these monetary distortions have no effect on the RBC economy. Real indeterminacy will arise only in the behavior of real cash balances, an indeterminacy that does not spill over into the rest of the model because of the assumption of separability. This implies that the indeterminacy results from the previous section holds: with Model 1, we have determinacy for γ < ½; for Model 2, we never have determinacy; and for Model 3, we always have determinacy.
Surprisingly, if U cm ≠ 0, but leisure is both separable and linear, the determinacy results replicate those of an endowment economy with U cm = 0. The reason why the conditions for determinacy are identical to an endowment economy with U cm = 0 can be seen if (using the above assumptions) we rewrite 10 and then substitute (10) into (11).
The equilibrium marginal utility of consumption is not directly affected by real money because it is entirely determined by the capital-labor ratio. Although the proof of the proposition exploits the linearity in labor preferences, this assumption is theoretically convenient but computationally irrelevant. For example, if instead of linear leisure there was a constant labor supply elasticity of 0.1 then with plausible calibrations the bounds for determinacy are largely unchanged in all three models. Model 1 is determinate if and only if γ < 0.5001, Model 2 is determinate if γ > 3740, while a search for a γ that would produce indeterminacy in Model 3 proved futile. The assumption that leisure is separable in utility also proved to have no quantitative importance.
Comparison to Continuous Time Models.
Since at least the seminal work of Sidrauski (1967) Benhabib et al. restrict the analysis in two ways. First, they only consider Taylor rules with non-negative coefficients on inflation, τ > 0. Since τ = γ/(γ-1), this implies that they omit discussion of γ's between zero and one. Thus, τ > 1 (an "active" policy) corresponds to γ > 1, while 0 < τ < 1 (a "passive" policy) corresponds to γ < 0. Second, the continuous time assumption implies that they restrict the equilibria to continuous time paths for real balances (along a perfect foresight path). This precludes oscillatory dynamics (complex roots are not possible in the flexible price setting as the system is 9 Benhabib et al also analyze a Calvo-style (1978) money-in-the-production-function (MIPF) economy. As first noted by Feenstra (1986) , such a model is isomorphic to a MIUF model with U cm < 0. Hence, MIPF results are a direct extension of the MIUF results.
one-dimensional) and corresponds to restricting ∆ = dm t+1 /dm t to be nonnegative. 
Conclusion.
Hippocrates advised the doctor to do no harm. This minimal advice is equally important to the central banker. In particular, a necessary condition for a good monetary policy is that the policy not introduce sunspot fluctuations into the real economy. This 22 paper has demonstrated that the class of policies that are "good" in this regard depends on basic assumptions about the modeling environment. Hence, a central conclusion of this analysis is that we need to think much more carefully about basic modeling assumptions when writing down monetary models. A lot depends on apparently trivial assumptions.
One example will illustrate this point. King and Wolman (1996) Since there is only one predetermined variable, for the economy to be determinate two eigenvalues need to lie outside the unit circle. e 3 is within the unit circle for ε ≥1/2.
Model 2
The proof mirrors that for model 1. Substituting (6) into the f.o.c. for labor yields Since there is only one predetermined variable, for the economy to be determinate two eigenvalues need to lie outside the unit circle. Only one does so the system is always indeterminate.
Model 3:
From equation (6) Since there is one predetermined variable the system is always determinate. QED
